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ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE EARLY ROBERTS COURT:
A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE BEHAVIOR*
James C. Phillips** and Edward L. Carter***
I. INTRODUCTION
President Obama's recent nominations of Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan to the Supreme Court stirred up support
among Democrats, opposition from Republicans, and attention
from the media, placing the Supreme Court again in the national
consciousness. In addition, the makeup of the Supreme Court is
under intense scrutiny internationally as cases with global
implications, such as those involving Guantanamo Bay detainees
and Mexican nationals on death row in the United States, make
up an increasingly prominent portion of the Court's docket.
In the context of politics, discussion about Supreme Court
justices often focuses simplistically on whether they are liberal
or conservative. The reality, however, is more nuanced. It has
been posited that justices tend to drift ideologically during their
time on the Court, and that most often the drift is from

* This is the second in a series of articles by the authors examining Supreme Court oral
argument from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. The first article examined
how information seeking and the quantity of verbal activity has changed from the 1960s to
the present, and that research sought to determine causes of justices' behavior during oral
argument. See James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Source of Information or "Dog and
Pony Show"? JudicialInformation Seeking During U. S. Supreme Court OralArgument,
1963-1965 & 2004-2009, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 79 (2010). The reader should note that
although Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined the Court before this article reached
publication, the research underlying it was conducted when Justice Alito was the most
junior justice.
** Ph.D. candidate in jurisprudence and social policy, University of California-Berkeley
School of Law.
** Assistant professor of communications, Brigham Young University.
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conservative to liberal.I But perhaps more important than

characterizing justices with broad political labels is
understanding how they actually decide cases and justify those
decisions. Clearly, each justice on the Court has a certain style
of judging that affects the results of the cases that reach the
Court. Generally, scholarly attention has been paid to the
Court's published opinions, which are (1) collective works not
only among nine justices but also their approximately three
dozen law clerks; and (2) not themselves decisions but rather
justifications for decisions reached earlier. The actual
decisionmaking process takes place behind closed doors with
little public insight available. Justices read briefs in their
chambers and hold decision conferences with no one present
other than themselves.
But there is one aspect of the process of judging at the
Court that is open to the public and that might give insight into
the decisions reached: oral argument. In the Supreme Court, oral
argument is the only time all the justices appear together to
consider a case in the public eye, and oral argument is the sole
public face of the Court's work between the time briefs are
submitted and opinions are published. Hence it is of great
importance, and yet it remains obscure and little understood.
The Court communicates with itself and the lawyers in deciding
a case, and oral argument provides a first-hand look at these
interpersonal and group communication processes.
With that reality in mind, this paper will progress as
follows: Part II will explore what justices themselves have said
about oral argument's function and value, what scholarly
research has uncovered about oral argument, and how oral
argument could predict justices' votes. Part III will describe how
the data for this study was collected and analyzed. Part IV will
provide a comparative picture of the justices' oral argument
behavior, and then look specifically at each justice and how that
justice's behavior may or may not be indicative of voting on the
merits. Finally, Part V will summarize the paper's findings,
weaknesses, and contributions.

1. See e.g. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal,
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important? 101

Nw. U. L. Rev. 1483 (2007).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Justices on Oral Argument
A review of justices' comments on the function and
importance of oral argument can divide justices into three
schools of thought: (1) oral argument is important in helping
decide cases; (2) oral argument's main function is to
communicate with other justices; and (3) oral argument has little
to no value. Within the camp of justices arguing that oral
argument helps decide cases there is delineation between those
who see oral argument as a general help, and those who see oral
argument as important in close cases, often dealing with obscure
law. Interestingly, it is generally justices from previous eras who
fall into the first camp, while more recent justices view oral
argument's value in determining cases as limited to a few
circumstances, possibly hinting at a shift in the function of oral
argument over time. 2
Many of the current or recent justices indicate oral
argument is used as a vehicle for communication with their
fellow justices, though less-recent justices have noticed this
function as well. Justice Ginsburg outlined five functions of
justices' questions and remarks during oral argument:
* to let counsel know what troubles the court, or at
least the questioner, about the case or the issue on
which counsel is holding forth;
* to satisfy the court on matters the judges think
significant, issues the judges might puzzle over in
chambers, and resolve less satisfactorily without
counsel's aid;
*

to cue counsel that an argument he or she is
pursuing with gusto is a certain loser, so that
precious time would be better spent on another
point;

2. A full discussion of justices' expressed views on oral argument can be found in the
authors' previous article. See Phillips & Carter, supra n. *.
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* to assist counsel to strengthen a position in hopes of
persuading one's colleagues; and
* to nail down a concession that will show up in an
opinion, perhaps in a footnote.3
B. Research on OralArgument
Research to date on oral argument by scholars, attorneys,
and observers of the Court can generally either be classified as
anecdotal or case-study in nature, or as more quantitatively
empirical.4 From more anecdotal research, often geared towards
practicing attorneys, others have found that justices may play the
role of antagonist or protagonist during questioning, justices
may make questions in form only with the purpose of stating
their opinion,6 justices use hypothetical questions to
communicate with each other, 7 justices use oral argument as a
pre-conference, justices hostile to one side will ask the majority
of questions to that side and justices supportive of a side will

3. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 567, 569
(1999). More generally Justice Ginsburg noted that "[olral argument, at its best, is an
exchange of ideas about the case, a dialogue or discussion between court and counsel." Id.
at 569. She did admit, though, that "[a]s between briefing and argument, there is nearuniversal agreement among federal appellate judges that the brief is more importantcertainly is more enduring." Id at 567. Finally, Justice Ginsburg classifies oral argument as
"a hold-the-line operation," for during her time on the bench she has "seen few victories
snatched at oral argument from a total defeat the judges had anticipated on the basis of the
briefs." Id. at 570. But she added that she has seen "several potential winners become
losers in whole or in part because of clarification elicited at argument." Id.
4. A more detailed review of research on oral argument can be found in the authors'
previous article. See Phillips & Carter, supran. *, at part IIB.
5. Donald S. Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States Supreme Court
Advocacy: An Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 2 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 89,134 (1978-79).
6. Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D'Amato, & Rosemary Metrailer, The Functions of
OralArgument in the U. S. Supreme Court,62 Quarterly J. Speech 410, 414 (1976).
7. E. Barrett Prettyman Jr., The Supreme Court's Use of Hypothetical Questions at
OralArgument, 33 Catholic U. L. Rev. 555 (1984).
8. Stephen M. Shapiro, Symposium on Supreme Court Advocacy: Oral Argument in
the Supreme Court of the United States, 33 Catholic U. L. Rev. 529, 530-31, 544-45
(1984).
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often jump in to help that side's attorney;9 oral argument is
similar to the Socratic method with the justices as professors and
lawyers as students,' 0 and justices try to persuade their
colleagues via their comments and questions in oral argument.I
More empirically rigorous research has discovered that justices
tend to use statements more than questions in oral argument;12
that justices strate~ically interrupt counsel in order to "score
rhetorical points";' that justices' questions can be divided into
either affirming, inquisitive, or challenging;14 and that justices
use oral ar ment to find out what their colleagues are thinking
on a case.
C. PredictingCase Outcomesfrom OralArgument Behavior
Many have taken note that justices quite often foreshadow
their leanings in a case during oral argument.16 In a qualitative
sense observers of the Court have found that )ustices' comments
and questions often predict voting patterns,' that justices speak
more to the side they will eventually oppose,' 8 that justices are
more hostile to the side they vote against,' 9 and that justices are

9. Id. at 547.
10. John Brigham, May It Please the Court.. ., L. & Cts. 3 (Spring 1995); see also
Wasby, et al., supra n. 6, at 414.
11. Lawrence Baum, May it Pleasethe Court..., L. & Cts. 4 (Spring 1995).
12. Neil D. McFeeley & Richard J. Ault, Supreme Court Oral Argument, 20
Jurimetrics 52, 71 (1979).
13. David R. Gibson, Opportunistic Interruptions: Interactional Vulnerabilities
Derivingfrom Linearization,68 Soc. Psychol. Q. 316, 331 (Dec. 2005).
14. Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Psychology of the Supreme Court 74-75 (Oxford U.
Press 2006).
15. Timothy R. Johnson, Oral Arguments and Decision Making on the United States
Supreme Court 59-67 (St. U. of N.Y. Press 2004).
16. For a more comprehensive review of Supreme Court vote forecasting, see Phillips
& Carter, supra n. *, at part IIC.
17. Cohen, supra n. 5, at 136; Wasby et al. supra n. 6, at 414; Linda Greenhouse, Press
Room Predictions, 2 Perspectives on Pol. 781 (2004) (comparing actual outcomes to
reporter's post-argument predictions) .
18. Tony Mauro, When In Doubt, Look to Roberts for Outcome of Supreme Court
Case, 236 Leg. Intelligencer 4 (July 19, 2007); John G. Roberts Jr., Oral Advocacy and the
Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. S. Ct. History 68, 75 (Mar. 2005); Sarah
Levien Shullman, The Illusion ofDevil's Advocacy: How the Justicesof the Supreme Court
Foreshadow Their Decisionsduring OralArgument, 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 271 (2004).
19. See generally Shullman, supra n. 18.
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more unsympathetic to the side they do not vote for on the

merits.20 In more quantitatively oriented studies, Timothy
Johnson and colleagues have determined that when the Court
speaks more to one side, or uses more unpleasant language to
one side during oral argument, the probability of that side
winning plummets.21 Due to the established link between oral
argument behavior and voting on the merits, Supreme Court
scholar Lee Epstein has cautioned against the use of prediction
models that fail to take into account oral argument behavior.22
Thus, despite conventional notions, information gathering
is just one of a few functions of oral argument, and likely not its
main function. Instead justices spend a large amount of time
asking pseudo-questions or making statements in order to
influence each other. These behavioral patterns do appear to
have predictive ability when it comes to which side ultimately
prevails, but we still do not know how individual justices are
behaving, and how such behavior might differ both across
justices and in the ability to predict each justice's eventual vote.
III. DATA MEASUREMENT AND COLLECTION

A. Measuringthe Seeking ofInformation
In order to create a valid and reliable measure of
information seeking, literature from psychology, law,2 3 rhetoric,
20. Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court: An
EmpiricalApproach 140 (Oxford U. Press 2008).

21. Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan C. Black, Jerry Goldman, & Sarah A. Treul, Inquiring
Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands with Questions at OralArgument in the

U.S. Supreme Court? 29 Washington U. J. of L. and Policy 241 (2009); Timothy R.
Johnson, Ryan C. Black, Sarah A. Treul, & Jerry Goldman, Jekyll and Hyde Questions

from

the Bench: Does the Emotional Nature of Justices' Questions Affect Their Votes on

the Merits? (unpublished ms. presented at Midwest Political Sci. Assn., Chicago, Ill., Apr.
4, 2009) (copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
22. Lee Epstein, Introduction to the Symposium-Forecasting U.S. Supreme Court

Decisions, 2 Perspectives on Pol. 757, 758 (Dec. 2004) (referring with approval to
Greenhouse, supra n. 17).
23. Most of the research on questioning in a legal setting is from trials in courtrooms,
which some may argue are irrelevant to the proceedings of an appellate case; however,
comments by the justices as well as findings by Court observers seem to indicate that in an
appellate trial the questioning justice acts like a questioning attorney in a trial setting, the
questioning justice's colleagues function as a jury that he or she is trying to persuade, and
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sociology1 interpersonal communication, and linguistics was
analyzed.4 Based on this research on interrogation, questions
can be first broken into three groups: genuine questions,
counterfeit or pseudo-questions, and non-questions.2 5 Dividing
up these three categories further, genuine questions include
open-ended questions (wh- questions),2 6 the highest degree of
information seeking; close ended, or bipolar, questions, the
lowest degree of information seeking for genuine questions; 27
and disjunctive questions, which are a hybrid of open- and
closed-ended questions.2 8 For pseudo-questions, leading
questions appear to contain a bit more information-seeking
qualities than rhetorical questions, as they can still be answered
in the affirmative or the negative, whereas rhetorical questions
do not really elicit a response, though, if misinterpreted, might
be met with an answer. 9 Finally, non-questions, if excluding
pseudo-questions, would consist of declarations. From these
question types and their relative degrees of information seeking,
the six-point scale shown in Figure I was created. With this
ordinal scale each sentence uttered by a justice in oral argument
can be given a numeric score so that an average informationseeking score can be generated for each justice per side that they

the attorneys engaging in oral argument become the witnesses. See e.g. David M. O'Brien,
Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 247 (7th ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
2005); Joan Biskupic, Justices Make Points by QuestioningLawyers, USA Today 7A (Oct.

6, 2006); Wasby, et al., supra n. 6, at 418; Baum, supra n. 11, at 4; Gibson, supra n. 13.
For additional sources addressing this point, see Phillips & Carter, supran. *, at part IIB.
24. For a more in-depth survey of questioning, see Phillips & Carter, supra n. *, at part
III.
25. Ronald B. Adler, Lawrence B. Rosenfeld & Russell F. Proctor II, Interplay: The
Process ofInterpersonalCommunication 199-202 (8th ed., Oxford U. Press 2001).

26. J. T. Dillon, The Practiceof Questioning 19-23 (Routledge 1990) (discussing uses
of various types of questions in various court proceedings).
27. Id.
28. Anne Walker Graffam, Linguistic Manipulation, Power, and the Legal Setting, in

Power Through Discourse 57,73 (Leah Kedar ed., Ablex Publishing 1987) (explaining that
a disjunctive question is a question that starts off having only two possible answers, such as
a yes/no question, but a phrase-such as "or something else"-is added to the end of the
question that opens up the possible answers); see also Sandra Harris, Questions as a Mode
of Control in Magistrates' Courts, 49 Intl. J. of the Sociology of Lang. 5, 10-11 (1984)

(classifying types of questions); Mark V. Redmond, Communication: Theories and
Applications 219-22 (2000) (including illustrations).
29. Irene Koshik, Beyond Rhetorical Questions: Assertive Questions in Everyday

Function 1-2 (John Benjamins Pub. Co. 2005).
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verbally engage. The higher the information-seeking score (ISS)
a justice receives, the more information seeking he or she
30
appears to be engaging in.
Figure 1
Degree-of-Information-Seeking Scale3 '
Seeking More Information

Seeking Less Information

Non-question
1

Pseudo-question
2

Declaration

Rhetorical

Closed question
3

Leading

Open-ended question

4

5

Bipolar

Disjunctive

6
Wh-

Table 1
Explanations and Examples of Question Coding
for Degree-of-Information-Seeking Scale
Level
Type
Explanation
Example
Value
I

Wh- question

An open-ended question
using who, what, when,
where, why or how

In what way are you
claiming the First
Amendment applies to this
case?

30. Our previous research had the information-seeking scale reversed so that a 1 would
represent a wh- question and a 6 would represent a declaration. However, due to the

unintuitive nature of having higher numbers indicate lower information seeking, we
reversed the scale for this article.
31. Examples and explanations of each question type and each level of the scale can be
found in Table 1, which follows Figure 1.
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Table 1 (continued)
Explanations and Examples of Question Coding
for Information-Seeking Scale
Level
Type
Explanation
Example
Value
Disjunctive
question

A closed question with an
add-on that allows room to
answer more openly

Are you claiming the First
Amendment applies to this
case, or are you claiming
something else?

Bipolar
question

A question with only two
answer options, such as
yes/no, true/false

Are you claiming the First
Amendment applies to this
case?

Tag or leading
question

A leading question, usually
framed in the negative, that
implies a certain answer

You are claiming the First
Amendment applies to this
case, are you not?

5

Rhetorical question

A question that does not
have an answer or to which
an answer is not sought

How in the world am I
supposed to believe your
claim that the First
Amendment applies to this
case?

6

Declaration

A statement without a
question mark

The First Amendment does
not apply to this case.

2

B. Case Selection
To avoid the potential problem of selection bias found in
our previous study, which only looked at cases with a high
degree of ideological salience, oral argument transcripts to be
included in the study were selected using random stratified
sampling to ensure cases with varying scenarios. The five case
types sampled for were (1) solicitor general as amicus party, (2)
solicitor general as main party, (3) non-solicitor general amicus
party, (4) female attorney arguing, and (5) no amicus or solicitor
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general attorneys. For each term from 2005 to 2008, two cases
were randomly sampled from each of these five categories.32
Ordinarily this would create ten cases for each year (two cases
multiplied by five categories), but in both the 2005 and 2008
terms there was only one case that fell into the "non-solicitor
general amicus party" category, leading to only nine cases
selected for those two terms. Hence a total of thirty-eight cases
were randomly selected for analysis from the four terms.
Additionally, cases from the 2005 term were only selected from
the point on which Justice Alito joined the Court. Moreover, the
data from nineteen cases related to the freedoms of speech and
press from the 2004 to 2007 terms used in a previous study were
compared to the data collected from the thirty-eight randomly
selected cases. A difference-of-means test showed that the data
from the two samples did not differ in a statistically significant
way, so those nineteen cases were added to the initial thirtyeight, bringing to fifty-seven the total number of cases included
in the study.
C. Coding Procedures
Utilizing content analysis, which some in the legal studies
community contend should be used more often as a research
methodology in legal scholarship,3 4 each sentence uttered by a
justice during oral argument was given an information-seeking
score ranging from one to six based on the previously defined
scale. Then, an average was created for each justice per side he
or she engaged in. If a justice did not speak to a particular side
in oral argument, they received a zero for their informationseeking score. If a justice did not engage both sides in a case,
then they were not given a score for that case due to the
possibility they may not have even been in oral argument.

32. Each case in a term was assigned a number, and then each of the five case types
were color coded. From each case type two cases were then randomly selected using a
random number generator that can be found. at http://www.randomizer.org/form.htm
(accessed Nov. 5, 2010; copy of home page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
33. See Appendix II for a complete list of the cases studied.
34. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial

Opinions, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 63 (2008).
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Additionally, the number of words a justice uttered to each side
was summed, with a zero given if a justice did not speak to one
side, and nothing recorded if the justice did not speak to both
sides.

Six coders in all anal, zed the cases, with some overlap in
order to ensure reliability. Each coder achieved a high degree
of intercoder reliability on practice material before scoring the
actual cases. 3 In determining the information-seeking score for
each sentence, coders were instructed that in instances where it
was not clear which of two categories a sentence should be
placed in, the category higher on the scale (meaning more
information seeking) should be chosen. From the thirty-eight
randomly selected cases, 7817 sentences were analyzed, and
from the nineteen freedom of speech or press cases, 5512
sentences were analyzed, totaling 13,329 sentences from the
fifty-seven cases included in the study.
Additionally, since it may not be the quality of the verbal
interaction between justices and counsel that matters, but instead
just the sheer quantity of words spoken by a justice, the average
word count for each justice for each side he or she interacted
with during oral argument was recorded. Some may argue that
information-seeking scores and word counts are capturing the
same construct, though it is unclear if lower information-seeking
scores would correlate with lower or higher word counts.
However, when excluding instances where the a justice does not
speak37 since both the ISS and word count would be zero,

35. The authors wish to thank Zach Anderson, Megan Moench, Rob Cook, Anesha
Brown, and Josh Guest for their invaluable coding assistance.
36. All coders achieved a .90 or better measured with Krippendorf's alpha.
Krippendorf's alpha can be used to measure the intercoder reliability of nominal, ordinal,
interval, and ratio-level data, and corrects some of the deficiencies of other well-known
measures: percent agreement, Scott's pi, Cohen's kappa, Pearson's r, and Holsti's cr. See
Klaus Krippendorf, Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common Misconceptions and

Recommendations, 30 Human Commun. Research 411 (July 2004); Andrew F. Hayes &
Klaus Krippendorf, Answering the Call for a Standard Reliability Measure for Coding

Data, I Commun. Methods & Measures 77 (2007). Krippendorf's alpha was measured in
SPSS 16.0 using a macro that can be found at http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes/
SPSS%20programs/kalpha.htm.
37. Such instances will sometimes be termed non-speaking observations. The
"observation" is from the point of view of the researcher, indicating that we observed no
speaking, and should not be confused with a justice's making a verbal observation during
oral argument, which cannot happen if he or she does not speak.
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correlation is low to moderate, 38 and when including nonspeaking observations correlation is almost nothing, 39 indicating
that information-seeking scores and word counts are not
measuring the same underlying construct.
IV. ANALYSIS
This part of the paper will consist of two sections. First, a
quantitative comparative examination of the justices will take
place on the two dimensions measured: information seeking and
word counts. Second, each justice will be investigated
individually to obtain a more complete picture of that justice's
behavior during oral argument, including both quantitative and
qualitative findings. Additionally, for each justice oral argument
behavior will be analyzed to see if that justice's eventual vote on
the merits can be predicted based on information seeking and
word counts.
A. Comparisonof the Early Roberts CourtJustices
Two information-seeking scores were created for each
justice for comparison with all of the other justices on the
Roberts Court, excluding the notably taciturn Justice Thomas,
who only spoke a couple of sentences in the fifty-seven cases
analyzed. The first score includes zeros for anytime a justice did
not speak to a side in a case. The second score excludes all of
the non-speaking observations, resulting in a higher score. As
can be seen in Figure 2, the justices clearly differ on the degree
of information seeking they engage in during oral argument.

38. Spearman's Rho = -.326, p < .001, N = 762.

39. Spearman's Rho= .009, p =.009, N

864.

337

THE EARLY ROBERTS COURT: ORAL ARGUMENT BEHAVIOR

Figure 2
Justices' Average Information-Seeking Score per Side
during Oral Argument
l Info-Seeking Score
1 Info-Seeking Score without Non-speaking Observations
4
3.31
3
2.43
2

21.94

2.48
2.02

2.9

2.06

2.12
V

19

1.94

42.43

1
Alito

Stevens Kennedy Ginsburg Roberts

Souter

Scalia

Breyer

In both conditions (with and without non-speaking
observations) Justice Alito is the justice engaging in the highest
level of information seeking during oral argument. On the other
end of the scale is Justice Breyer who does not quite average a
rhetorical question every time he talks during oral argument,
indicating he asks very few questions in relation to declarations,
and the questions he does ask are of lesser information-seeking
value.
Turning to word counts, an interesting finding emerges in
that the justices who have higher information-seeking scores are
the justices who speak less during oral argument, and the
justices who speak the most during oral argument have the
lowest information-seeking scores. Like the information-seeking
scores graph, each justice received two word-count averagesone with and one without non-speaking observations, as shown
in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Justices' Average Word Counts per Side during Oral
Argument
MWord Counts

0 Word Counts without Non-speaking Observations

500

405.6

395.9

424.1

400
341.5
300
235
200

.
136.7 142.7

100

0
Alito

Stevens

Kennedy

Ginsburg

Roberts

Souter

Scalia

Breyer

Excluding Justice Thomas, the justice who speaks the least
during oral argument is Justice Alito, with Justices Souter,
Scalia, and Breyer all on the other end of the spectrum as the
most verbose justices on the early Roberts Court, averaging
nearly four times as many words uttered to each side during oral
argument compared to Justice Alito. In fact, on average these
three justices together speak more than the other six justices
combined.
By
simultaneously
examining
both
dimensions
(information-seeking scores and word counts), a pattern emerges
with the early Roberts Court separating into three clusters of
justices based on oral argument behavior, as can be seen in
Figures 4 and 5. The first cluster is the least inquisitive and most
talkative and consists of Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Souter. The
second cluster, Justices who are middle-of-the-road in
information seeking and verbal activity, is made up of the Chief
Justice, and Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and arguably, Justice
Stevens. The final cluster are the justices who are the least
talkative and most inquisitive, and for the early Roberts Court
that consists solely of Justice Alito.
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Figure 4
Combined ISS and Word Count for All Observations
400

*
*

Breyer
Souter

*

Scalia

300

Roberts
Ginsburg *

a

2Kennedy
Stevens *

M100

Alito

0
2.6

2.4

2.2

2

1.8

1.6

Average Information-Seeking Score Per Side

Figure 5
Combined ISS and Word Counts
Excluding Non-Speaking Observations
500
Breyer
6

*

400

Souter

Scalia
300Rbrt
*
20
200

Ginsburg
Kennedy

*Stevens
Alito

100
0
1.75

2

2.25

2.5

2.75

3

3.25

3.5

Average Information-Seeking Score Per Side

By including Justice Thomas with the other justices into a
two-dimensional portrayal of the type of justice each is
regarding information-seeking and word counts, one can see
there are really four categories of justice regarding oral
argument behavior with Justice Thomas falling into the
uninquisitive, reserved category, as can be seen in Figure 6. No
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partisan patterns emerge as both conservative and liberal justices

can be found in the varying categories. 4 0
Figure 6
Two-Dimensional Portraitof Roberts Court Justices
during Oral Argument
Alito
Roberts
Ginsburg

Kennedy
Stevens
Scalia
Breyer

Souter
Thomas

In examining the percentage of the time that justices do not
verbally engage a side during oral argument, perhaps not
surprisingly Justice Alito leads the Court with the highest
percentage (excepting Justice Thomas) as Justice Alito chooses
not to speak to over a quarter of the parties that come before him
for oral argument. Justice Stevens follows, not speaking to just
over a fifth of the parties in oral argument. After that, however,
the order breaks from the patterns in information seeking and
word counts with Justices Souter and Breyer, both low in
information seeking and high in word counts. The Chief Justice,
in the middle of the pack as far as information seeking and word
counts are concerned, is the least likely to refrain from verbally
engaging with a side during oral argument, which can be seen in

40. Figure 6 is based on justices' ISS and word counts for all observations, and in it,
the names of the justices considered to be conservative are in italics.
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Figure 7. (This is not due to his administrative responsibilities in
giving the green light to attorneys to begin their arguments or
informing them that their time is up, as such statements were not
included in the coding.)
Figure 7
Percentage of Sides in Cases Not Verbally Engaged
by Each Justice
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B. IndividualLooks at the EarlyRoberts Court Justices
This section will examine each justice individually, first
from a qualitative angle in order to get a sense of the tone and
style the justice uses during oral argument. From this qualitative
picture a description or typology was created and which is the
title following the justice's name. Then a quantitative
examination of each justice will follow.
1. The ChiefJustice: Gentle but Astute Administrator
In his first year on the Court, the Chief Justice prominently
proclaimed that his goal was to build consensus on the Court
while deciding cases on narrow grounds. 4 1 Befitting his role, the
Chief Justice at oral argument sometimes undertakes to keep his
colleagues from venturing too far astray in their questioning. For
41. Associated Press, Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, 155
N.Y. Times A16 (May 22, 2006).
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example, it appeared in Morse v. Frederick42 that the Chief
Justice had finally had enough of his colleagues' hypothetical
questions when he gently guided them-not to mention the
attorney trying to respond to their dizzying array of doomsday
scenarios-back on track: "Can we get back to what the case is
about?" he asked.4 3 He went on to succinctly state the attorney's
position in order to draw attention, seemingly for benefit of his
colleagues, to the weaknesses of the argument."4 Likewise in
Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC"5 the Chief Justice handled an
escalating verbal tug-of-war between Justices Souter and Scalia
by simply indicating which justice the Court would hear from:
JUSTICE SOUTER: But YellowtailATTORNEY: -which involves veryJUSTICE SOUTER: -is-is an ad of-an obviously sham
ad. The problem that we're dealing withJUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Bopp, did-did the opinion refer
toJUSTICE SOUTER: May-may I finish?
JUSTICE SCALIA: -sham ads?
JUSTICE SOUTER: Excuse me. May I-may I finish my
question?
JUSTICE SCALIA: Did the opinion refer toCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Souter.
JUSTICE SOUTER: May I finish my question? Thethe-no one is saying that your ad in this case is an
obviously sham ad like Yellowtail .

46

42. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
43. Transcr., Morse v. Frederick, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 48 (Mar. 19, 2007)
(551 U.S. 393 (2007)) (accessed Oct. 12, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). To access any oral argument transcript cited in this article, highlight
"Oral Arguments" on the left side of the Supreme Court's home page, click on "Argument
Transcripts," and scroll down to "Argument Session: [beginning date]-{ending date]," for
the date span that includes the argument date.
44. Id.

45. 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
46. Transcr., Wis. Right to Life v. FEC, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 15-16 (Jan.
17, 2006) ((546 U.S. 410 (2006)) (accessed Oct. 12, 2010; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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The Chief Justice's gentle demeanor extends not just to his
colleagues but to the lawyers at oral argument as well. In Beard
v. Banks,4 7 the Chief Justice noted that a lawyer had responded
to a question by another justice in a way that undermined the
lawyer's position; the Chief Justice did not jump on the error
like some justices might have, but instead tried to help the
lawyer see his error. Even so, the Chief Justice ultimately
joined the majority in siding against that lawyer's client.4 9
In another case, the Chief Justice once again restrained
himself from harshly criticizing an attorney with whom he
disagreed and who seemed to have made a mistake: "I'm just
not sure your agreement with it is advisable," he said.o
Additionally, the Chief Justice is straightforward enough to
acknowledge when he is making a point at oral arFument rather
than seeking new information or asking a question.
That being said, the Chief Justice will occasionally get
pointed with an attorney who brazenly presses forward with a
foolish argument, as he did with the lawyer representing the
religious group Summum in PleasantGrove v. Summum: 52
MS. HARRIS: And that is exactly why, Justice Kennedy,
the city, any city, is permitted to make a decision that it will
close its public parks to all unattended displays. The Court
said that in Pinette. It said that earlier in Vincent. But
because thereCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How far do you push that? I
mean, what about the hypotheticals on the other side? I
mean, you have a Statue of Liberty; do we have to have a
statue of despotism? Or do we have to put any president

47. 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
48. Transcr., Beard v. Banks, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 40 (Mar. 27, 2006) (548
U.S. 521 (2006)) (quoting the Chief Justice: "Well, then now you're giving- now you're
making their situation worse .... ")(accessed Oct. 12, 2010; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
49. Beard, 548 U.S. at 524.
50. Transcr., Carey v. Musladin, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 20 (Oct. I1, 2006)
(549 U.S. 70 (2006)) (accessed Oct. 12, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
51. See e.g. Morse Transcript, supra n. 43, at 54 (quoting the Chief Justice: "That gets
back to the point I was trying to make earlier.
52. _ U.S. _,
129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
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who wants to be on Mount Rushmore? How do you answer
those? 53
The Chief Justice sits in the middle of his colleagues when
it comes to oral argument, both literally and behaviorally. His
average information-seeking score is 2.12 when including nonengaged sides and 2.19 when not including non-engaged sides,
placing him second and fifth respectively for inquisitiveness. A
frequency distribution of his information-seeking scores (ISS)
over the 102 sides he saw in the cases analyzed in this study
reveal relatively normal distribution, indicating relatively
consistent information-seeking across all sides, as shown in
Figure 8.
Figure 8
Distribution of the Chief Justice's Info-Seeking Scores
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The Chief Justice's average word count per side is 297.3
(with non-engaged sides) and 306.3 (without non-engaged
sides), putting him fifth in both instances among his colleagues.
A frequency distribution of word counts for the Chief Justice
reveals a right-skewed distribution, showing that he tends to
53. Transcr., Pleasant Grove v. Summum, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 35 (Nov.
, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009)) (accessed Oct. 12, 2010; copy on file
12, 2008) C_ U.S.
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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utter fewer words than his average of 297 might indicate, but a
few instances of heavy verbal engagement shift the mean
upward, as can be seen in Figure 9.
Figure 9
Distribution of the Chief Justice's Word Counts
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Using Bayesian estimation,54 a combined portrait of the
Chief Justice's oral argument behavior on the two dimensions
measured during this study can be presented, yielding the
patterns displayed in Figure 10.

54. Bayesian estimation and graphics were produced by statistical program Amos 7.0.
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Figure 10
Bayesian Estimation of the Chief Justice's
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The black oval-shaped mass in the center of the graphic on
the left represents the ninety-five percent confidence interval for
the combined ISS and word counts.5 5 The fact that the oval is
wider than it is tall attests to the above-mentioned frequencies
distributions wherein the ISS distribution was more tightly
packed around the mean, compared to the distribution of word
counts with the high values far away from the mean. The ninetyfive percent confidence interval for the Chief Justice's true ISS
mean falls between 1.96 and 2.28, and we can be ninety-five
percent confident that his actual word count average is located in
the range of 251.4 to 343.0
In examining whether the Chief Justice's behavior during
oral argument foreshadows his eventual vote on the merits,
information-seeking scores are not a statistically significant
predictor of his voting patterns. To determine this, probit
55. A ninety-five percent confidence interval is used when one obtains statistical
information from a sample rather than from the entire population. Because sample data is
used one cannot be completely sure of the means obtained. Therefore, confidence intervals
are calculated allowing one to obtain a certain level of confidence that the true means-the
means of the population-are contained within the range of scores identified. In this
instance, using confidence of ninety-five percent, we can be ninety-five percent sure that
the true means for ISS and word counts for the Chief Justice for every case he has ever
been involved in lies between the ranges identified by the dark black oval.
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regression was performed. Similar to studies done by Johnson
and colleagues, the dependent variable was whether the Chief
Justice voted for the petitioner, with the two independent
variables being the ISS for the petitioner minus the ISS for the
respondent and the word count for the petitioner minus the word
count for the respondent.5 6
For the Chief Justice, while ISS did not matter, word counts
are a statistically significant predictor of the Chief Justice's
voting, with higher word counts when compared to the other
side signaling a decreased probability he will support that side,
as shown in Figure 11. Such disproportionate treatment should
not be surprising given the Chief Justice's previous statements
on the role of oral argument in his decisionmaking process as he
has written that oral argument is like the end of a funnel where
his ideas begin to "crystallize," causing a formerly open mind to
begin "to close at oral argument" in favor of one side over the
other.5 7
Figure 11
Probability of the Chief Justice Voting for a Party
Based on WC Differences
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Once the Chief Justice exceeds 450 words uttered to one
side over another in a case, the probability of supporting that

56. The variables were formulated this way because what really matters is not how
much information seeking or speaking a justice does to one particular side, but how much
the justice does to one side in comparison to the other side.
57. Roberts, supra n. 18, at 70.
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side drops below fifty percent, equaling bad news for that party.
If the Chief Justice shows the same attention verbally to both
sides during oral argument, then the petitioner would have a
probability of prevailing above seventy percent.58 While this
might seem odd at first, petitioners often do better than
respondents in Supreme Court cases for the reason that the
Supreme Court is more likely to hear a case to overturn a lower
court's decision then to hear a case merely to affirm a lower
court's ruling. These results, though, only explain about ten
percent of the Chief Justice's voting patterns.5 9
2. Justice Stevens: Reserved, Polite Veteran
Justice Stevens was the most senior member of the Court
during this time period, both in age (born in 1920 and thirteen
years older than the next eldest justice) and in tenure, having
taken his seat in 1975, eleven years before the next longestserving justice.60 Whether a reflection of an earlier period's rule
of decorum or his personality, Justice Stevens is the only justice
who frequently asks counsel if he can ask them a question (and
no attorney ever responded in the negative in the cases analyzed
in this study). While possessing a relatively high ISS, Justice
Stevens will sometimes ask questions he already knows the
answer to, as he did in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life:6 1
JUSTICE STEVENS: Would it also prohibit you from
using-urging everyone to look to a web site that used the
same magic words?
ATTORNEY: Would it?

58. See Table 2 in Appendix I for more details relating to this conclusion.
59. Pseudo R2 = .1047.
60. See Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://
www.supremecourtus.gov (highlight "About the Supreme Court," click on "Biographies of
Current Justices of the Supreme Court," scroll down to "John Paul Stevens (Retired),
Associate Justice") (accessed Oct. 12, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
61. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
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JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes. 62
Such instances may reflect Justice Stevens's practice of using
oral argument to influence the thinking of his colleagues.
Additionally, like the Chief Justice, Justice Stevens is not above
admittin when he is trying to make a point, though in Rumsfeld
v. FAIR he makes his point using a question:
JUSTICE STEVENS: So, theGENERAL CLEMENT: -hypothetical.
JUSTICE STEVENS: -the point I'm trying to make is,
Does your agreement, that you can engage in speech by
posting banners or handing a note, apply to symbolic
speechGENERAL CLEMENT: It couldJUSTICE STEVENS: -the kind of conduct that is
symbolic speech? 64
Justice Stevens seldom gets involved in lengthy discussions
with attorneys and appears to be content to allow his colleagues
most of the speaking time.
After Justice Alito, Justice Stevens has the highest average
information-seeking score (minus non-speaking observations) at
2.43, which is 25.3 percent higher than Justice Breyer's loweston-the-Court ISS. As shown in Figure 12, Justice Stevens's
frequency distribution of information-seeking scores with the
non-speaking observations is skewed right with a high
proportion of non-speaking.

62. Transcr., FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 52 (Apr.
25, 2007) (551 U.S. 449 (2007)) (accessed Oct. 13, 2010; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
63. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
64. Transcr., Runsfeld v. FAIR, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 23 (Dec. 6, 2005)
(547 U.S. 47 (2006)) (accessed Oct. 13, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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Figure 12
Distribution of Justice Stevens's
Information-Seeking Scores
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Turning to frequency of verbal activity, again Justice
Stevens is second only to Justice Alito, both in having low
average word counts and in the high percentage of time Justice
Stevens does not speak at all to a side in a case during oral
argument. Justice Stevens's average word count is 142.7 with
non-speaking observations included and 182.5 without, less than
half of the more verbose justices, and 21.8 percent of the time he
refrained from saying anything to a side in a case. The frequency
distribution for word counts is right skewed with a few instances
of extreme verbal engagement that have the effect of inflating
the mean score. This pattern is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13
Distribution of Justice Stevens's Word Counts
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Combining these two estimations to show the Bayesian
estimated ninety-five percent confidence intervals indicates
Justice Stevens's "true" mean ISS to likely be between 1.69 and
2.19 and "true" mean word count to fall between 115.5 and
169.9 words, as can be seen in Figure 14.
Figure 14
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By themselves, both information-seeking scores and word
counts were statistically significant predictors of Justice
Stevens's voting patterns. However, because of their moderate
correlation, 6 6 when combining both variables in an analysis, ISS
ceased to be statistically significant, though the two variables are
jointly significant.6 7 Thus, probabilities for voting were
calculated by looking at the variables before combining them,
and the results of that calculation are graphed in Figure 15.

Figure 15
Probability of Justice Stevens Voting for Petitioner
Based on ISS Differences
Justice Stevens: ISS Differences Not Controlling for Word Count
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The more information-seeking Justice Stevens engaged in
with a side, compared to the other side, the less likely he was to
eventually vote for that side. Thus, at one extreme, if Justice
Stevens merely spoke declarations to the petitioner (ISS score of
1) and asked wh- open-ended questions to the respondent (6),
the ISS difference would be -5 and the probability of supporting
the petitioner would be close to ninety percent. At the other
extreme for Justice Stevens's data, if he asked only whquestions to the petitioner and averaged asking leading questions
to the respondent, there would be less than a forty percent
65. Technically ISS just missed statistical significance at p = .055, though it was close
enough that we labeled it statistically significant.
66. Pearson's r = .476, p <.001.
67. See Table 2 in Appendix 1.
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chance he would support the petitioner. However, informationseeking scores on their own only explain about six percent of
Justice Stevens's voting habits. Word counts do a slightly
better job of predicting his votes, as can be seen from the data
displayed in Figure 16.
Figure 16
Probability of Justice Stevens Voting for Petitioner
Based on WC Differences
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Examining the fifty percent threshold for supporting the
petitioner in a case versus the respondent, when Justice Stevens
speaks approximately fifty words or more to the petitioner above
and beyond those spoken to the respondent, then he is
increasingly likely to vote for the respondent, and vice versa.
Hence, similar to the rule for the Chief Justice, less attention
from Justice Stevens in oral argument is better for the advocate.
However, at best the combined variables of ISS and word counts
are onl explaining around nine percent of Justice Stevens's
voting.

3. Justice Scalia:Assertive Law Professor
In the fifty-seven cases we studied, Justice Scalia, a former
law professor quite familiar with the Socratic method, proved
68. Pseudo R2 = .0577.
69. Pseudo R2 = .0935.
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himself to be an aggressive participant in oral argument.70 As
illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, Justice Scalia is one of the
least inquisitive and most verbally active on the Supreme Court
bench. His participation tends to come in the form of
declarations, rhetorical questions, leading questions and yes/no
questions rather than open-ended questions. For example,
Justice Scalia became very involved in directing the argument of
Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler in the following
exchange, which took place during the oral argument in

Veneman v. Livestock Marketing Association:71
JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. KneedlerMR. KNEEDLER: What the numbersJUSTICE SCALIA: -can I come back to Rust versus
Sullivan? You say that that was a government speech case?
I had not recollected it as a government speech case.
MR. KNEEDLER: This CourtJUSTICE SCALIA: This is government subsidizing speech
by private organizations, and it chose to subsidize one type
of speech, but not another.
MR. KNEEDLER: YesJUSTICE SCALIA: Did we say, in the opinion, that this
wasMR. KNEEDLER: Not in Rust, but in the Court's
subsequent cases, Rosenberger, Southworth-in particular,
in Velazquez-this Court said that Rust has come to be
understood by the Court as a government speech case,
because the government prescribed the message, and it's
government speech whether or not the government speaks
for itself or enlists others to transmit the message.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, for the precise purpose at issue
here, I think it makes a lot of difference. You can fund
private people for some things, and not fund them for
others, and it doesn't make whatever they say government
speech. I think that's a70. Admitting to a potential nexus between his classroom experience and courtroom
demeanor, Justice Scalia explained his sometimes overbearing behavior during oral
argument behavior this way: "It is the academic in me. I fight against it. The devil makes
me do it." O'Brien, supra n. 23, at 248.
71. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
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MR. KNEEDLER: ButJUSTICE SCALIA: -I think that's a reallyMR. KNEEDLER: -but there's really noJUSTICE SCALIA: -strong proposition, that whenever
you're subsidizing any private enterprise, the speech of that
private enterprise becomes public speech.
MR. KNEEDLER: There's really no need to get to that
point here, because the Beef Board, which is the entity that
does the speaking, is, I think, unquestionably a government
body. It's established by special statute under the Lebron
test. All of its members are appointed by theJUSTICE SCALIA: That's fine. But what you were using
Rust for was to establish the proposition that in order to be
government speech, it-you don't have to-you don't have
to say, "This is the government speaking."
MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I thinkJUSTICE SCALIA: And Rust doesn't stand for that.
MR. KNEEDLER: -Right .... 72
This exchange becomes particularly noteworthy in light of
the Court's holding in favor of the government in a majority
opinion written by Justice Scalia. The Court held that beef
producers could not succeed in a First Amendment challenge to
a government-mandated beef advertising program funded by the
beef producers themselves.7 3 In order to reach this holding,
Justice Scalia had to distinguish Rust v. Sullivan,74 in which the
Court held that government-funded doctors spoke for the
government and thus had to deliver the government-approved
family planning message, and Legal Services Corporation v.
Velazquez, 75 in which the Court held that government-funded
lawyers did not speak for the government and thus their message
could not be controlled. Key to this distinction was
interpretation of what the Court actually said in Rust, and it was
72. Transcr., Veneman v. Livestock Marketing Assn., http://ww'w.supremecourt.gov at
13-15 (Dec. 8, 2004) (decided as Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550

(2005)) (accessed Oct. 13, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
73. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 567 (vacating decision below in favor of the association).
74. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
75. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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clear at oral argument that Justice Scalia wanted to guide the
government lawyer toward the interpretation that the majority

opinion ultimately gave to Rust.
When confronted with the argument of the beef producers
who did not want to be forced to pay for an advertising
campaign that they disagreed with, Justice Scalia pressed and
attempted to pin down First Amendment attorney Laurence H.
Tribe, himself a Harvard law professor and a law school
classmate of Justice Scalia:

JUSTICE SCALIA: Let's first address the question you
said-you said you were going to address, whether in order

to be government speech, within the meaning of our cases,
it has to be identified as such. Is that really true? I mean,

you know, in World War II, Bob Hope would appear in
movie theaters and say, you know, "Buy war bonds?"
MR. TRIBE: Yes, I don'tJUSTICE SCALIA: "This is Bob Hope. You people ought
to go out now"MR. TRIBE: Justice Scalia, I think, although it's an
interesting digression about whether the government is
being candid, the objection here has nothing to do with that.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay, so it isMR. TRIBE: But being the governmentJUSTICE SCALIA: -it is not essentialMR. TRIBE: It may be.
JUSTICE SCALIA: -that government might-in order to
be government speech, the government does not have to
identify itself as the speaker.
MR. TRIBE: IJUSTICE SCALIA: Yes or no? Yes or no?
MR. TRIBE: I think the answer is yes, it must identify
itself, but it doesn't help, becauseJUSTICE SOUTER: Well, it doesn'tMR. TRIBE: -the governmentJUSTICE SOUTER: -we understand that you have a First
Amendment claim, which you're going to have even if we
say, "This is not government speech." I think the whole
point here is to decide whether this is even-
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MR. TRIBE: No, no, Justice-

JUSTICE SOUTER: -an issue that should be disposed of
on any grounds other than candor.
MR. TRIBE: Justice Souter, I think that we're getting off
track by assuming that it helps for it to be government
speech. My point is that a central theme of thisJUSTICE SCALIA: Well, just indulge us. I mean, some of
us think it makesMR. TRIBE: Let meJUSTICE SCALIA: -a differenceMR. TRIBE: Well, butJUSTICE SCALIA: -and I wouldMR. TRIBE: -but let me ask you whetherJUSTICE SCALIA: -I would like to know whether it is
essential to its character as government speech that the
government's [sic] say, "This your [sic] government
speaking."
Frequently Justice Scalia locks horns with attorneys for
protracted verbal entanglements when he disagrees with their
arguments. He is also quick to insert a comment or two to aid an
attorney representing a position he favors when that lawyer is
drowning under a barrage of hostile questioning from other
justices, as he did in Carey:
JUSTICE SCALIA: To apply an opinion of this Court to
particular circumstances, and find that in the view of the
court of appeals, it produces a certain result is not
necessarily to say that that is clearly established Supreme
Court law. It just means that is their best guess as to how it
comes out, right?
ATTORNEY: That's correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, they're forced to decide it one
way or the other, the Supreme Court opinion either means
this or that. They're not applying a clearly established test
to the Supreme Court, are they?
ATTORNEY: Not by doing that ...n

76. Veneman Transcript,supra n. 72, at 32-34.
77. Carey Transcript,supra n. 50, at 6.

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

358

Additionally, more than any other member of the Court,
Justice Scalia uses humor strategically, either to disrupt an
attorney's line of reasoning, or to slow down another justice's
assault on a lawyer.
Justice Scalia's mean information-seeking score of 1.90
places him with Justices Breyer and Souter as the least
inquisitive of the early Roberts Court as he averages less than a
rhetorical question every time he utters a sentence to counsel. A
distribution frequency of his information-seeking scores shows a
relatively normal distribution, with a few potential outliers on
either extreme of the scale, as shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17
Distribution Frequency of Justice Scalia's
Information-Seeking Scores
Info

Mean
=1 90
Std.Dev.=0.625
N =114

30

20U

Cr
U_

10-

00.0000

1.0000

20000

3.0000

4.0000

Info

One of the most verbally active justices, again along with
Justices Breyer and Souter, Justice Scalia averages about 378
words per side during oral argument. A frequency distribution of
his average word counts shows a non-normal distribution
skewed to the right, meaning that a few intense verbal
engagements have shifted his average word count score higher
than would be suggested by the word counts for the majority of
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his performances. This atypical distribution is shown in Figure
18.
Figure 18
Distribution Frequency of Justice Scalia's Word Counts
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A graphic display of Bayesian estimation on the two
variables allows for the presentation of a two-dimensional
picture of Justice Scalia's oral argument behavior, which is
shown in Figure 19.
Figure 19
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We can be ninety-five percent confident that the actual

value of Justice Scalia's mean information-seeking score lies
between 1.78 and 2.02, and the actual value of his word count
average can be found in the range of 333.8 to 423.4.
Turning to predicting Justice Scalia's voting patterns based
on his oral argument behavior, unlike any other justice examined
in this study, both information-seeking scores and word counts
are statistically significant predictors of his voting patterns.7 8
Similar to other justices where word counts matter in foretelling
voting, increased verbal activity in relation to the other side
lowers the probability of supporting that side. However, unlike
the few other justices where information-seeking scores are
statistically significant predictors of voting, the higher Justice
Scalia's ISS (meaning more inquisitiveness), the higher the
probability Justice Scalia will support that side, as Figure 20
indicates. A study of the transcripts shows that this pattern
derives from the fact that Justice Scalia tends to batter attorneys
he will eventually oppose with declarations, while he is more
likely to lob softball questions to sides he ends up voting for.
Figure 20
Probability of Justice Scalia Voting for Petitioner
Based on ISS & WC Differences
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When Justice Scalia pays a significant amount more of
attention to a side in a case, irrespective of how much
78. See Table 2 in Appendix I.
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information seeking he engages in, the probability of his

supporting the "ignored" side is very high. When his verbal
activity is equal, then only in instances in which he engages in
low levels of information-seeking with a side is there a less than
fifty percent chance that he will support the petitioner. However,
when word counts for a side are much higher compared to the
opposing side in a case, there is only a greater than fifty percent
probability of his supporting that high-word-count side if he
engages in high levels of information-seeking with that side.
Thus, for Justice Scalia and only for Justice Scalia, both word
counts and information seeking matter in foreshadowing his
eventual vote. More than those of any other justice, his
information-seeking scores and word counts help explain Justice
Scalia's eventual votes on the merits, with the two variables
combined predicting nearly a third of his voting habits. 79
In summary, Justice Scalia speaks much, particularly to the
side he will vote against, and inquires little, especially of the
side he will oppose. He has indicated that oral argument "rarely"
changes his mind, but that it "can make the difference" in
"close" cases.80 Interestingly, one piece of evidence suggesting
that Justice Scalia heads into oral argument strongly leaning
towards deciding for one side or the other is his sometimes
circulating a memo about a case before oral argument, a practice
not joined by his colleagues and one that violates the justices'
unwritten tradition of not speaking to each other about a case
prior to hearing it argued.81
4. Justice Kennedy: Cut-to-the-ChaseQuestioner
As the Roberts Court's swing or median justice, Justice
Kennedy likely wields a disproportionately large influence
compared to the other justices who tend to be more consistently
liberal or conservative. Possibly because he recognizes the fact

79. Pseudo R = .3265

80. The Tim Russert Show, TV Series (MSNBC May 3, 2008); transcript available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24466429 (accessed Oct. 14, 2010; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
81. E-mail from David M. O'Brien, Leone Reaves & George W. Spicer Professor, U.
of Va. & author of Storm Center, to James C. Phillips, Scalia cite (July 7, 2009) (noting
that a memo of this type was familiarly known at the Supreme Court as a "Ninogram").
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that many cases will come down to his vote, he repeatedly tends
to be very candid in his requests from counsel, asking them to
boil down their argument or authority, as he did in Morse v.
Frederick: "I'm asking what your recommendation is to what
our rule should be in this case,"8 2 and in Davis v. FEC:8 3
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the party for the less wellfunded candidate has the option to have much closer ties,
much greater involvement, than the party for the other
candidate; and that seems to me highly problematic. And I
want to know the best case that you have for that
proposition and the best statement of law that you can give
me for why that is unconstitutional. 84
Similarly, Justice Kennedy seems to exhibit little patience
for unfruitful lines of questioning as he attempts to get at the
core issues in a case, such as in this example from Tory v.
Cochran:8 5
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well-well, there really-there are
findings against you, and to say that a lawyer is a crook, a
liar, and a thief and you're trying to tell us that that's not
defamatory, I mean, I-I think we should just proceed onon some other basis for this argument. We have other
questions to discuss. 6
This impatience to get to the issues Justice Kennedy finds most
important can cause attorneys to have to adjust quickly, as in
this example, when Justice Kennedy allowed an amicus attorney
to utter only one sentence of his opening statement before
showing a lack of interest in the lawyer's prepared remarks and
direction:
MR. GARRE: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it
please the Court:

82. Morse Transcript, supra n. 43, at 20.
83. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
84. Transcr., Davis v. FEC, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 19-20 (Apr. 22, 2008)
(554 U.S. 724 (2008)) (accessed Oct. 14, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
85. 544 U.S. 734 (2005).
86. Transcr., Tory v. Cochran, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 10-11 (Mar. 22, 2005)
(544 U.S. 734 (2005)) (accessed Oct. 14, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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The First Amendment does not prevent the government
from speaking out in order to revive and expand the market
for the nation's most important agricultural product.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: If we can just continue on
government speech, because that's whereMR. GARRE: Yes.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: -where we left off. It seems to me
there is something offensive about making a particular
portion of the public pay for something that the government
says.
MR. GARRE: Justice KennedyJUSTICE KENNEDY: It ought to be out of the general
fund. 87
As is fitting given his central position in the Court's
decisionmaking, Justice Kennedy falls near the median of
information-seeking on the Roberts Court with an ISS of 2.02
when including non-speaking observations and 2.22 when
excluding them, ranking him fourth and third on those measures,
respectively. A frequency distribution shows a rather consistent
performance with only a few exceptions outside his norm, which
can be seen in Figure 21.
Figure 21
Distribution of Justice Kennedy's Average
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87. Veneman Transcript,supra n. 72, at 20-21.
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Regarding word counts, Justice Kennedy ranks third on the
current Court (fourth if Justice Thomas is included with his near
zero average), speaking 196 words per side when non-speaking
observations are included and 215 when they are not, which is
about twice of Justice Alito and half of Justice Breyer, the two
ends of the word count continuum. Justice Kennedy is also fifth
of the eight justices examined in this study when it comes to
how many sides he chooses not to verbally engage, with that
figure being 8.9 percent. The frequency distribution for Justice
Kennedy's average word counts reveals a high number of
instances in which he says little or very little, and a somewhat
normal distribution after that with a couple of outliers, all as
shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22: Distribution of Justice Kennedy's
Average Word Counts
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The visual portrayal of the Bayesian estimation of the
means of both variables shows that the ninety-five percent
confidence interval for Justice Kennedy's average ISS lies
between about 1.82 and 2.22, and for his average word counts is
between 169.2 to 222.9, which the patterns shown in Figure 23
both indicate.
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Figure 23
Bayesian Estimation of Justice Kennedy's
Average ISS and WC
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Because of Justice Kennedy's fairly equal treatment of both
the sides he votes for and against (possibly because he is usually
not leaning one way or the other when he enters oral argument),
neither his information-seeking scores nor his word counts are
statistically significant predictors of his votes on the merits in
the cases analyzed in this study."
5. Justice Souter: InconsistentDominator
While lacking Justice Scalia's acerbic wit, Justice Souter is
the member of the Court most like Justice Scalia in his penchant
for dominating oral argument in a case for stretches of time, as
well as in his habit of pushing attorneys for answers he seeks,
even not waiting for them to provide the "correct" answer, as in
Haywood v. Drown:89
JUSTICE SOUTER: What if the New York legislature
passed a statute saying the-the State court supreme court
will not have jurisdiction over 1983 actions for-for harm
committed on Wednesday? Would you say that that was a
jurisdictional rule?
88. See Table 3 in Appendix I.
89.
U.S.
, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009).
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MS. UNDERWOOD: I thinkJUSTICE SOUTER: I will answer the question for you, if
you want.
MS. UNDERWOOD: I think it would be hard toJUSTICE SOUTER: You wouldn't have.
MS. UNDERWOOD: -to find a rationale for it.
[intervening questioning by Justice Scalia]

JUSTICE SOUTER: Would you say it was jurisdictional so
long as the Supreme Court said-or so long as the State
legislature said, no State or Federal actions for-for-for
Wednesday damages? Would you call that jurisdictional?
MS. UNDERWOOD: I would call it very strange.
JUSTICE SOUTER: You might call it crazy outside of
court, but the one thing you wouldn't do is walk into a
court and say it's jurisdictional.
And the-my-the point I am getting at is, the finer the
comb that- that- that keeps the certain class of case out,
the less plausible it is to say that this is a jurisdictional kind
of criterion sense of it?90
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life Justice Souter pressed an
attorney in hopes of getting a particular concession, and
somewhat castigated the attorney when he apparently did not
receive what he considered to be the correct response:
JUSTICE SOUTER: You mean the people in North
Carolina were unaware of the Edwards position, they were
unaware of the distinction between Faircloth and Edwards?
MR. BOPP: I have no idea.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Of course they knew that.
MR. BOPP: I have no idea.

90. Transcr., Haywood v. Drown, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 45-47 (Dec. 3,
2008) _ U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009)) (accessed Oct. 14, 2010; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Of course, this is not the only argument in
which Justices Souter and Scalia have interrupted each other. Perhaps because of their
verbal similarities, Justices Souter and Scalia will sometimes talk over and around each
other in oral argument, as previously noted when looking at the Chief Justice's handling of
his colleagues. See text accompanying n. 45, supra.
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JUSTICE SOUTER: Of course they knew that. And just as
presumably, you knew the position of Senator Feingold in
these advertisements, and the people in the state knew
because of your other-because of your other public
statements.
MR. BOPP: Because of one or two press releases?
JUSTICE SOUTER: Why should those things be ignored?
MR. BOPP: There's absolutely no evidence that anyone in
Wisconsin knew his position on the filibuster.
JUSTICE SOUTER: You think they're dumb?
MR. BOPP: No.
JUSTICE SOUTER: You have a web site. You have a web
site that calls their attention, and you think nobody's going
to it?
MR. BOPP: But we can't run the ads, we can'tJUSTICE SOUTER: Nobody's paying attention to what the
Senator is doing?
ATTORNEY: If we can't run the ads, we can't draw
peoples [sic] attention to the web site.
JUSTICE SOUTER: You think the only source of
information about Senator Feingold is your advertisement?
MR. BOPP: No, but I don'tJUSTICE SOUTER: Then if your advertisement is not the
sole source of information, then why do you assume that no
one in Wisconsin knows what the senator has been doing
when he votes.
MR. BOPP: Look, polls show that a majority of the people
don't even know who the Vice President of the United
States is. So to suggest that they know a particular
positionJUSTICE SOUTER: So your position is that we ignore
context because no one-because the voters aren't smart
enough to have a context? 9 1

Thus, while jurisprudentially quite distinct, when it comes
to oral argument behavior, Justices Souter and Scalia have quite
a bit in common.

91. FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life Transcript,supra n. 62, at 37-38.
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Justice Souter ties for seventh in ISS including non-

speaking observations (1.74) and ranks sixth for inquisitiveness
excluding non-speaking observations (2.06), placing him in the
trio of low-information-seeking justices along with Justices
Scalia and Breyer. A look at the frequency of his mean
information-seeking scores shows a very narrow distribution,
with a few outliers to the right and a healthy portion of instances
of non-speaking, as shown in Figure 24.
Figure 24
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Similarly, Justice Souter ranks sixth (including nonspeaking instances) and seventh (excluding non-speaking
instances) with mean word counts of 341.5 and 405.6
respectively, again placing him with Justices Breyer and Scalia

as the most garrulous on the Court. Interestingly, Justice Souter
is behind only Justices Alito and Stevens (if Justice Thomas is
not counted) when it comes to the percentage of the time he does
not verbally engage a side in a case with a rate of 16.7 percent.
Thus, whereas Justice Souter will sit silently during oral
argument a fair amount of the time, comparatively speaking,
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when he does engage, he out-talks most other justices. This
pattern is reflected in the relatively flat, almost bimodal
distribution of his average word counts if one ignores the high
frequency of zero word counts, which is shown in Figure 25.
Figure 25
Distribution of Justice Souter's Average Word Counts
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A view of the graphic portrait of Bayesian estimation of
Justice Souter's combined ISS and word counts indicates the
ninety-five percent confidence interval for his actual mean
information seeking ranges between 1.54 and 1.93 and for his
true mean word counts ranges between 288.1 and 395.1, which
can be displayed graphically as in Figure 26.
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Figure 26
Bayesian Estimation of Justice Souter's
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In predicting Justice Souter's votes on the merits, both
information-seeking scores and word counts were statistically
significant, though word counts explained more than ISS

(sixteen percent versus ten percent).9 Unlike Justice Scalia's
scores, Justice Souter's ISS and probability of support results
indicate a negative relationship, meaning that the more
information seeking Justice Souter engages in with a side, the
less likely he is to vote for that side. Because of the two
variables' moderate correlation,93 when combining the ISS and
word counts in statistical analysis, ISS ceased to be statistically
significant, though word counts still predicted voting. Together
the two variables explain about nineteen percent of Justice
Souter's voting patterns. 94 When controlling for informationseeking scores, the probability of Justice Souter voting for the
petitioner decreases the more he speaks to the petitioner
compared to the respondent, which is shown in Figure 27.

92. Pseudo R2 values of .1602 and .0986 respectively.
43
93. Pearson's r = . 1, p = .001.
94. Pseudo R2 =.1901.
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Figure 27
Probability of Justice Souter Voting for Petitioner
from ISS & WC Differences
Justice Souter: Word Counts Controlling for ISS
1
0.9
0.8
0.0.7

0.6
0.5
0.4
S0.3
S0.2
a2 0.1
-1100

-800

-500

-200

100

400

700

Word Count for Petitioner Minus Word Count for Respondent

In cases in which Justice Souter speaks 600 words or more
to the respondent above and beyond what he speaks to the
petitioner, the probability he will support the petitioner is above
ninety percent. When the word counts for the two sides are
equal, there is about a seventy percent chance he will vote for
the petitioner. And when Justice Souter utters 400 more words
or more to the petitioner versus the respondent, the probability
of his voting for the petitioner drops below fifty percent. 95 Given
Justice Souter's loquaciousness during oral argument, it will be
interesting to see if his replacement, Justice Sotomayor, fills the
void, if other justices pick up the slack, or if the Court speaks
less without him.
6. Justice Thomas: Reserved Observer
Justice Thomas is well known for his courtroom silence.
While many have put forth theories as to why he so seldom
wades into oral argument, he has himself declared that oral
argument is "not the real meat" of the role of the Supreme

95. See Table 3 in Appendix I for more details.
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Court. 96 Furthermore, Justice Thomas has stated, "I don't see the
need for all those questions [during oral argument]. I think
justices, 99 percent of the time, have their minds made up when
they go to the bench." 97 Directly addressing his oral argument
reticence, Justice Thomas simply explained: "[i]f I wanted to
talk a lot, I would be on the other side of the bench." 98
In the fifty-seven cases examined in this study, Justice
Thomas spoke in only one case: Holmes v. South Carolina.99
Given their rarity, we quote his remarks in full:
MR. ZELENKA: I see my time is about up, but I wouldJUSTICE THOMAS: Counsel, before you change subjects,
isn't it more accurate that the trial court actually found that
the evidence met the Gregory standard?
MR. ZELENKA: No. He specifically found, I believe, from
my readingJUSTICE THOMAS: Well, he saysMR. ZELENKA: -that it didn't meet the Gregory
standard.
JUSTICE THOMAS: Well, he says at first blush, the above
arguably rises to the Gregory standard. However, the
engine that drives the train in this Gregory analysis is the
confession by Jimmy McCaw White. And then he goes on
to say that that, of course, can't be introduced because it's
hearsay. So it-it seems as though he says that if it is to be
believed what Jimmy White says, it meets the Gregory
standard. So I don't quite understand where Gay, which is
subsequent to-to this case-where Gay comes in because
it didn't seem to be the standard that the trial court
applied. 100

96. Tony Mauro, Courtside-Is the Court Above it All? Recent Events Demonstrate a
Strong Urge to Go Its Own Way, 27 Leg. Times 10 (Mar. 29, 2004).
97. Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court: An
Empirical Approach 25 (Oxford U. Press 2008).
98. Michael A. Fletcher and Kevin Merida, Jurist Mum Come Oral Arguments;
Reticence on Bench Perplexes Observers, Wash. Post Al l (Oct. 11, 2004).

99. 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
100. Transcr., Holmes v. S. Car., http://www.supremecourt.gov at 43-44 (Feb. 26, 2006)
(547 U.S. 319 (2006)) (accessed Oct. 20, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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While drawing a general conclusion about Justice
Thomas's overall oral-argument behavior from such a tiny
selection is presumptuous, this sample is nonetheless the only
empirical evidence of his style that can be analyzed in the
sample taken for this study. Justice Thomas spoke six sentences,
the first being a leading question, the rest being declarations. He
uttered a total of 129 words, had an information-seeking score of
1.29, and consequently voted against the side he engaged with in
oral argument.
7. Justice Ginsburg: Consummate Academic
Justice Ginsburg's verbal style in oral argument is like
Justice Scalia's-that of the law professor who never asks a
question that she does not already know the answer to-though
Justice Ginsburg's questioning lacks the edge that Justice
Scalia's often has. This academic approach probably should not
be surprising given both Justice Ginsburg's background in legal
pedagogy and remarks she has made linking the behaviors of the
courtroom and the classroom:
I enjoyed the give-and-take characteristic of appellate
advocacy as a lawyer and law teacher; I enjoy it even more
as a judge. . . . (My revered former D.C. Circuit colleague,
Carl McGowan, a truly great appellate judge, once said,
and I agree: "Law teaching and appellate judging are more
alike than any other two ways of working at the law.")' 0 '
In Carey Justice Ginsburg's questioning exemplified this
almost pedagogic approach when she pushed the attorney to a
conclusion she sought:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But in here it-you agree that the
California court has as much authority to say what Federal
law is as the Ninth Circuit, right? They are on a par. Ninth
Circuit decisions in no way binds the Supreme Court of
California. Isn't that so?
MR. FERMINO: That is correct.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that this state court of appeals
chose to be respectful to the Ninth Circuit to consider what

101. Ginsburg, supra n. 3, at 567.
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it had said, doesn't sound to me like a very strong
argument.
MR. FERMINO: Well Justice Ginsburg, I would
respectfully disagree .... 2
Likewise in Davis v. FEC Justice Ginsburg attempted to get a
reluctant attorney to concede a point:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How is the government speaking?
You have already acknowledged that the wealthy candidate
can spend as much as he or she wants and the end result of
this scheme is that there will be more, not less, speech
because the non-affluent opponent will now have money to
spend that he didn't have before. So I think you have to
concede that overall the scheme will produce more political
speech, not less.
MR. HERMAN: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I can't concede
tht .103'
that. .....
Possibly reflecting her previous time as a law professor,
Justice Ginsburg does not shy away from an old-fashioned
lecture when she feels it is necessary, as was apparently the case

in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v.
Brentwood:104
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Blumstein, there's one feature
of this that I find puzzling. You're making this a First
Amendment case. But you joined an association that has
such, certain rules and when one joins, one agrees to abide
by the rules.
Nothing in the world stops Brentwood from saying this
anti-recruiting rule is a really bad rule, it is unfair to us; you
could have written op ed pieces about it, the school could
have talked about it, the school could have urged the board
of education to drop it. Nothing stopped you from attacking
this rule that you don't like. But when you signed on, the
First Amendment doesn't give you license not to follow the
rules that you disagree with. 0 5

102. Carey Transcript,supra n. 50, at 29-30.
103. Davis Transcript,supra n. 84, at 5-6.
104. 551 U.S. 291 (2007).
105. Transcr., Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assn. v. Brentwood, http://www.supreme
court.gov at 27 (Apr. 18, 2006) (551 U.S. 291 (2006)) (accessed Oct. 20, 2010; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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But Justice Ginsburg is just as willing to aid an attorney as
challenge him or her, as she did after Justice Scalia's humorous
attack in Scheidler v. NOW, Inc.,106 almost appearing to be
directly responding to Justice Scalia himself:
JUSTICE SCALIA: How-I mean, can we do that in a case
that comes up here, and just say, "There are good
arguments on both sides, it's quite plausible," and remand
the case without resolving the issue?
[Laughter.]
JUSTICE GINSBURG: They asked the District Court to
resolve it. They said the District Court should resolve it in
the first instance, and then they would review it,
presumably.
MR. UNTEREINER: That's right, Justice Ginsburg. ... 107
Similarly Justice Ginsburg seemed to be throwing the
solicitor general
a rope in Davenport v. Washington Education
10 8
Association:o
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is it relevant, General Clement,
that the legislature didn't seem to be, or the ballot initiative
didn't seem to be focused at all on beefing up the rights of
the non-member of the union? It seemed to be concerned
with the integrity of the election process, because they left
the same old Hudson in place for union nongermane
spending that didn't have to do with elections.
MR. CLEMENT: That's absolutely right, Justice Ginsburg.
109

Justice Ginsburg engages in about the same amount of
information seeking as do Justice Kennedy and the Chief
Justice, with an ISS of 2.09 with non-speaking observations and
2.21 without them, ranking her third and fourth in those
categories, respectively. A look at the frequency of her
information-seeking scores shows a tighter distribution than is
106. 547 U.S. 9 (2006).
107. Transcr., Scheidler v. NOW, http://www.supremecourt.gov at 14 (Nov. 30, 2005)
(547 U.S. 9 (2006)) (accessed Oct. 20, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
108. 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
109. Transcr., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Assn., http://www.supremecourt.gov at 20-21
(Jan. 10, 2007) (551 U.S. 177 (2007)) (accessed Oct. 20, 2010; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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typical among the other members of the Court, with a single
outlier to the right of the scale, all as shown in Figure 28.
Figure 28
Distribution of Justice Ginsburg's Average
Information-Seeking Scores
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For average word counts per side, Justice Ginsburg again
falls between Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice, placing
fourth with averages of 235.9 (all observations) and 249.1
(speaking observations only) words per side. Justice Ginsburg's
distribution of word counts is even more narrow than her ISS
distribution, with a slight skew and an outlier to the right, as
Figure 29 indicates. More than most justices, Justice Ginsburg
rarely fails to say something to a side in a case, ranking her sixth
on the Court with only 5.3 percent of sides in the cases analyzed
failing to hear her voice during oral argument.
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Figure 29
Distribution of Justice Ginsburg's
Average Word Counts per Side
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Combining ISS and word counts into a graphic
representation of their Bayesian estimated means and ninety-five
percent confidence intervals shows that Justice Ginsburg's
actual mean ISS has a ninety-five percent probability of falling
between 1.92 and 2.26 and that her actual mean word count per
side can be found with ninety-five percent certainty between
197.6 and 274.4, as indicated in Figure 30.
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Figure 30
Bayesian Estimation of Justice Ginsburg's
Average ISS and Word Counts
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Justice Ginsburg's voting patterns cannot be predicted from
her information-seeking scores, but the difference between her
average word counts with petitioners and average word counts
with respondents is a statistically significant predictor of
whether she will vote for the petitioner. This calculation is
shown in Figure 31.
Figure 31
Probability Justice Ginsburg Will Support Petitioner Based
on WC Differences
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Similar to our results for other justices, the more Justice
Ginsburg speaks to a side, the less likely she is to vote for it.
When Justice Ginsburg utters 180 or more words to the
respondent in a case, she has a ninety percent or greater chance
of supporting the petitioner. When she gives equal treatment in
verbal quantity to both sides in a case, her likelihood of
supporting the petitioner drops to about seventy percent. And
when Justice Ginsburg speaks 140 or greater more words to the
petitioner versus the respondent, the probability of her voting for
the petitioner drops below fifty percent."l 0
8. JusticeBreyer: King of the Hypothetical
More than any other member of the early Roberts Court,
Justice Breyer uses hypothetical questions during oral argument.
Maybe partly because of the time necessary to develop some of
his hypothetical scenarios, Justice Breyer can monopolize oral
arguments for long sections of time, often giving attorneys little
opportunity to speak. Justice Breyer's hypotheticals not only
provide challenges for attorneys, but they are also sometimes not
clear to his fellow justices. One even prompted the following
unusual exchange in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education,"' in which Justice Scalia asked Justice Breyer a
question:
JUSTICE BREYER: But suppose you go back to the very
old, bad days of the 1950's in the South, the '60's. They
pass some civil rights legislation. A lot of legislation was
passed in the '60's. Now, under that civil rights legislation,
imagine an individual had been kept out of a restaurant or
he'd been treated physically badly, not because of his race.
He was white, but he was associating with people who
were black. And they both go into the restaurant and they
both are refused service. Maybe they're beaten up. I mean,
both of them.
Now, can the white individual bring a lawsuit under thethe civil rights statute? I've always thought the answer to
that question is, of course, he can. Would you-do you
think it's the contrary answer?
110. See Table 3 in Appendix I for more details.
11l. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
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MR. THOMAS: Justice Breyer, in that context-

JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.
MR. THOMAS: -I -I would say yes.
JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, of course.
MR. THOMAS: But againJUSTICE BREYER: So thereforeJUSTICE SCALIA: Is this a civil rights statute that

provides for a private cause of action? I-I want to know
what the hypothetical is.
JUSTICE BREYER: I'd-I'd like to-I'm thinking of
various civil rights statutes which make it unlawful to
describe-to--to discriminate. .112
Sometimes Justice Breyer appears to go off on a bit of a
tangent, speaking his inner thoughts but not really engaging the
attorney. In Pleasant Grove, for example, he interrupted Justice
Stevens's questioning, and when the attorney finally got back to
answering Justice Stevens's question, Justice Breyer did not
seem to catch the answer because he continued to press the
attorney about the response he had just uttered:
JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, supposing the Government in
the Vietnam Memorial decided not to put up the names of
any homosexual soldiers. Would that be permissible?
MR. JOSEFFER: Yes. When the-when the Government is
speaking, it can choose who to memorialize and who notJUSTICE BREYER: That seems to be the problem here.
And what I have in this is the-the problem I have is that
we seem to be applying these subcategories in a very
absolute way. Why can't we call this what it is-it's a
mixture
of private
speech
with
Government
decisionmaking-and ask the question, as we do in election
cases, is the restriction proportionate to a legitimate
objective? I know how you're going to answer that
question. You're going to say: Of course, it is.
But what's interesting me is, are we bound in these cases to
apply what I think of as an artificial kind of conceptual
112.

Transcr., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd ofEduc., http://www.supremecourt.gov at 33-

34 (Nov. 30, 2004) (554 U.S. 167 (2005)) (accessed Oct. 20, 2010; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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framework or are we free to ask what seems to me to be at
the heart of the matter? The answer to Justice Steven's
hypothetically [sic] is: Of course the Government can't do
that because it's disproportionate.
JUSTICE STEVENS: I didn't get the answer. Did youMR. JOSEFFER: Yes, the Government can choose to
memorialize who it wants on the mall. When the
Government is-now, to be clear, that's under the Free
Speech Clause.
JUSTICE BREYER: So what is the answer to the-what is
the answer to Justice Stevens's hypothetical? What is the
answer to the homosexual hypothetical? What is the
answer?1 3
Justice Breyer is one of the Court's least inquisitive
justices, with average information-seeking scores of 1.9 (with
non-speaking observations) and 1.99 (without non-speaking
observations) that place him sixth and last, respectively, in each
case, not counting Justice Thomas. As Figure 32 shows, a
frequency chart of his average information-seeking scores
reveals a narrow distribution skewed to the right.
Figure 32
Distribution of Justice Breyer's
Average Information-seeking Scores
Info

40

aMen
=1.74
Std. Dev. =0832
N =108

30-

Info

113. Pleasant Grove Transcript,supra n. 53, at 23-24.
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Furthermore, Justice Breyer was the most talkative justice
examined in this study. If non-speaking instances are included,
Justice Breyer averages uttering nearly 381 words per side, and
if non-speaking instances are excluded Justice Breyer's mean
word count per side is 424 words-almost the equivalent of
Justices Alito, Stevens, and Kennedy combined. Justice Breyer's
distribution of average word counts is non-normal and rather
evenly spread out, as Figure 33 shows. But despite his verbosity
during oral argument, ten percent of the time Justice Breyer will
not engage a side, placing him in the middle of his colleagues in
that area.
Figure 33
Distribution of Justice Breyer's
Average Word Counts per Side
Word

Mean=380 94
Std. Dev. =265.545
N =10B

IL

Word

The ninety-five percent confidence interval for Justice
Breyer's average ISS as determined using Bayesian estimation
gives the range of 1.58 to 1.91, and the ninety-five percent
confidence interval for his average word count is 329.4 to 432.6,
both of which are illustrated in Figure 34.
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Figure 34
Bayesian Estimation of Justice Breyer's
Average ISS and Word Counts
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Further, Justice Breyer's voting patterns cannot be predicted
using either his information-seeking scores or his word
counts." 4
9. JusticeAlito: Inquisitive but Reserved Newcomer
While serving for thirteen years on the Third Circuit,
Justice Alito was given the moniker of "Scalito" or "Little
Scalia" for his consistently conservative jurisprudence."s Yet
during Supreme Court oral argument, Justice Alito, as the
Court's newest member, is the polar opposite of Justice Scalia,
and, if anything, could be called "Little Stevens" for the
similarities between the two justices' verbal styles. Though
mild-mannered and polite, Justice Alito is not a pushover. He
does hold attorneys' feet to the fire, usually by restating their
argument in such a way that they feel compelled to further
114. See Table 4 in Appendix I.
115. See e.g. Shannon P. Duffy, The Mild-Mannered Scalia, 228 Leg. Intelligencer 1
(Mar. 3, 2003) (noting the Scalito nickname but stating that Justice Alito's "tone during
oral arguments is probing but always polite").
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justify it."6 He also tries to help attorneys understand other
justices' questions, as he did in the case of an attorney who
failed to respond to a question asked by Justice Souter:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, what about the situation in
which the contract runs for a year and you bill monthly? On
your theory the contract is still going on and yet there is no
prepayment. I assume on your argument they would be just

as bound by the California policy as if they got a hundred
percent payment up front.

MR. GOTTESMAN: Well, that's-that's a question
about a meaning of a provision that isn't at this issue in
this case. The ones that are at issue in this caseJUSTICE SOUTER: Well, do you concede that if they-if
all they did under a 12-month contract was-was bill for
services rendered every past 30 days, that there would be

either no application of the California law or that the
application would be pre-empted?
MR. GOTTESMAN: That might well be the case. But we
don't have an interpretation of that provision of the
California law.
JUSTICE ALITO: I'm sorry. That was an either/or.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE ALITO: Which might be the case?
MR. GOTTESMAN: Oh. I say it might be the case.
JUSTICE SOUTER: It's like saying yes.
MR. GOTTESMAN: Yes.
(Laughter).
MR. GOTTESMAN: But again, that issue isn't here ... .117
Justice Alito does not tend to monopolize time in oral
argument and, unlike many of the other justices, will not engage
in lengthy back-and-forth with attorneys. Generally he is content
to ask a question or two at a time, and allow the attorney to
expound on an answer, or to allow other justices to pursue
116. Transcr., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, http://www.supremecourt.gov at

41 (Mar. 19, 2008) ( 554 U.S. 60 (2008)) (quoting Justice Alito during an exchange with a
lawyer: ". . . it's your position that . . .") (accessed Oct. 23, 2010; copy on file with Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process).
117. Id. at 44.
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further the line of reasoning initiated by his question or
comment.
Justice Alito undoubtedly engages in the most information
seeking of any member of the Roberts Court, with an average
ISS of 3.31 after subtracting non-speaking observations. (His
ISS is 2.43 with non-speaking observations.) While such a score
is only an average of a little more than one leading question
every time he speaks, this score is 33.5 percent higher than that
of the next closest justice-Justice Stevens-and 70.6 percent
higher than the justice with the lowest ISS: Justice Breyer. As
Figure 35 indicates, a frequency distribution shows a somewhat
normal distribution with a large portion of non-speaking
observations. In fact, Justice Alito has the highest percentage of
instances in which he does not speak to a side in a case at 26.7
percent.
Figure 35
Distribution Frequency of Justice Alito's
Information-Seeking Scores
Info
25

Mean=2.43
Std.Dev =1.667
N =90

Info
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Regarding word counts, Justice Alito is the least talkative
justice outside of Justice Thomas, averaging just over 100 words
per side, approximately a fourth of what the most verbally active
justices speak. A look at the frequency of word counts for
Justice Alito exhibits a non-normal severely right skewed
distribution, which is shown in Figure 36. Occasionally Justice
Alito can get wordy, at least compared to his norm, but he never
strays into the verbal territory of Justice Breyer or Justice
Souter.
Figure 36
Distribution Frequency of Justice Alito's Word Counts
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Std.Dev. =102.115
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Bayesian estimation graphically portrayed reflects the
frequency distributions above with the ninety-five percent
confidence interval showing that Justice Alito's true mean for
ISS falls between about 2.07 and 2.78, and for word counts can
be found between around 78.3 to 122.3, both as shown in Figure
37.
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Figure 37
Bayesian Estimation of Justice Alito's
Average ISS and WC
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While some might argue that Justice Alito's relative
inquisitiveness, low verbal activity, and high rate of nonengagement are evidence of his junior status on the Court and
will likely change as his seniority increases, the justice most
similar to him on these dimensions-Justice Stevens-is
currently the most senior justice on the Supreme Court. Only
time will tell if these initial findings reflect Justice Alito's
courtroom style and personality, or if they are indicators of his
comparative newcomer status.
Because of Justice Alito's relatively even hand as far as his
verbal treatment of sides in cases is concerned, neither
information-seeking scores nor word counts predicted his
voting." Hence, like a few of the other justices, Justice Alito's
eventual vote on the merits in a particular case cannot be
determined from his oral argument behavior as measured by ISS
or word counts.

118. See Table 4 in Appendix I.
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V. CONCLUSION
In summary, this study's findings were twofold:
First, the justices on the early Roberts Court vary on the
degree of information seeking and speaking that they do during
oral argument, with the justices classifiable into four categories.
At one extreme are the most talkative, least inquisitive justices,
who tend to ask very few meaningful questions, monopolize
counsel's time, and make their own points: Justices Breyer,
Souter, and Scalia. Next are the median justices who are neither
the most nor least talkative, and who are average in their
information seeking compared to their colleagues: the Chief
Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Stevens. Then there
is the category of the reserved but inquisitive justice who does
not speak as much as other members of the bench, but does ask
meaningful questions: Justice Alito. Finally, there is the
category of the reserved and verbally uninquisitive justice who
rarely speaks and even more rarely asks questions: Justice
Thomas.
Second, the oral-argument behavior of five of the nine
justices on the early Roberts Court tends to portend their
eventual votes on the merits based on their disparate treatment
of the two sides in the areas of information seeking and word
counts. For five of the justices-the Chief Justice and Justices
Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, and Stevens-the more they speak to
one side, the less likely they are to vote for that side. For threeJustices Scalia, Souter, and Stevens-information-seeking levels
predicted eventual voting. For Justices Souter and Stevens, the
more information seeking they engaged in with a side, the less
likely it was that they would support that side. Just the opposite
appears to be the case for Justice Scalia, however, with higher
levels of information seeking from a particular side increasing
the probability he would vote for that side in a case. In
comparison, Justices Alito, Breyer, and Kennedy did not signal
their voting intentions via information seeking and word counts.
Obviously no study is without weaknesses. Studying oral
argument by merely analyzing transcripts is rather onedimensional, as tone and body language are redacted from the
analysis, limiting the findings. Also, the transcripts may have
some errors-where, for example, the transcriber placed a

THE EARLY ROBERTS COURT: ORAL ARGUMENT BEHAVIOR

389

comma instead of a period or a period instead of a question
mark-and this would have influenced the way in which those
sentences were coded. Finally, the information-seeking scale
used in this study may not be a perfect ordinal measure, and
other ways to look at and measure the question types used by the
justices may be a more accurate way to gauge information
seeking.
That being said, and despite this study's weaknesses, the
findings are important for practitioners, observers of the Court,
and scholars of judicial behavior. For those who actually argue
before the Supreme Court, a better understanding of how
justices signal their leanings will help attorneys to read justices
during oral argument and tailor their argument more effectively.
For observers of the Court, particularly journalists, this study
provides empirical methods that can be employed to predict with
greater certainty how justices will vote in any given case. And
for scholars of the Court, this study adds fodder to the debate
over whether justices' behavior and decisionmaking are based
more on strategic, legal, or ideological reasons; it also shows
that the justices are sufficiently different that multiple measures
of their behavior should to be used to capture individual
variance. Future studies should determine whether justices have
merely predetermined their decisions and are engaging in
persuasive behavior towards their colleagues via their questions
to counsel at oral argument, or whether they are merely
beginning to crystallize their thoughts on the case before them
during oral argument and engaging in one last attempt to test
their most developed theories as to who should win on the
merits.
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APPENDIX I
Table 2
Probit Regression of Petitioner Vote:
The Chief Justice and Justices Stevens and Scalia' 19

Word Difference

-.0012* (.0005)

3
-.0013* (.0005)

-

-

.063 (.208)

.135 (.220)

.609* (.201)

.515* (.207)

.558** (.217)

ISS Difference

Constant

2

1

ROBERTS

-

F-test for Word & ISS

-

-

51

51

51

Wald X'

5.39*

.09

6.16*

Pseudo R'

.0994

.0013

.1047

Log pseudo-likelihood

-27.82

-30.85

-27.66

1

2

3

Observations

STEVENS
Word Difference

-

-.0023* (.0010)

-.0018* (.0011)

-

-.189* (.099)

-.110 (.105)

.097 (.186)

ISS Difference

.254 (.179)

.148 (.196)

F-test for Word & ISS

-

-

735*

Observations

55

55

55

Wald X'

5.88*

3.67

735*

Pseudo R'

.0785

.0577

.0935

-34.45

-35.23

-33.89

I

2

3

Constant

Log pseudo-likelihood

SCALIA
Word Difference

.0029**

ISS Difference

Constant

-

(.006)

-

.709"* (.M7)

.44* (.1)

-,0032_*

(.0007)

-463* (.210)

.563- (.183)

F-test for Word & ISS

-

Observations

57

57

(.2")
-

57

20.16***

4.20*

Pseudo R'

.2517

.046

.3265

Log pseudo-likelihood

-2532

-31.65

-22.79

Wald X

119. Note that 'p:5.10; *p

5.05; **p :5.01; and***

p:5.001.

20.31**
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Table 3
Probit Regression of Petitioner Vote:
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburgl2 0
3

2

I

KENNEDY
Word Difference

-. 0005 (.0011)

-

-.0006 (.0010)

ISS Difference

-

.088 (.160)

.096 (.158)

Constant

.820*** (.201)

.754*

Observations

56

56

56

Wald X'

(.199)

.785*** (.210)

.21

.30

.76

Pseudo R

.0034

.0063

.0107

Log pseudo-likelihood

-29.00

-28.91

-28.78

2

1

SOUTER

3

2

Word Difference

-.0016*** (.0005)

-

.0013* (.0005)

ISS Difference

-

-.334* (.147)

-.206 (.140)

Constant

.474** (.184)

.368* (.181)

.462* (.187)

Observations

57

57

57

Wald X'

10.57**

5.18*

11.96**

Pseudo R'

.1602

.0986

.1901

Log pseudo-likelihood

-31.02

-33.29

-29.92

3

2

1

GINSBERG
Word Difference

.0041** (.0016)

-

-.0041* (.0016)

ISS Difference

--

216 (.166)

.132 (.152)

Constant

-565** (.191)

.227 (.170)

.554** (.193)

Observations

57

5

57

Wald X'

6.74**

149

6.73*

Pseudo R'

.2838

.0317

2920

Log pseudo-likelihood

-27.53

-37.22

-27.22

120. Note that *p <-.05; **p!< .01; and ***p .001.
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Table 4
Probit Regression of Petitioner Vote:
Justices Breyer and Alitol21

1

2

3

4

Word Difference

-.0006 (.0005)

--

-.0006 (.0005)

--

Log respondent

--

--

-

.699* (.342)

BREYER

Word Count
.016(.174)

.045 (.183)

.038 (.165)

.324 (.223)

.486 (.185)

.329 (.223)

-3.780 (2.079)

Observations

54

54

54

54

WaldX'

1.27

.01

1.33

4.17
.0663

ISS Difference
Constant
F-test for Word/ ISS

Pseudo R'

.0197

.002

.0208

Log pseudo-

-32.97

-33.63

-32.94

-31.41

1

2

3

4

likelihood

ALITO

-.0017 (.0014)

Word Difference

-.0023 (.0014)

-

Log respondent

-

--

ISS Difference

-

-. 117 (.078)

-.080 (.084)

_

Constant

.325-(.198)

.385'(.205)

.370'(.205)

_

F-test for Word/ ISS

-

-

3.96

Observations

45

45

45

Wald X

2-68

2.26

3.96

_
_

Word Count

2

Pseudo R

.0480

.0414

.0637

Log pseudo-

-28.40

-28.60

-27.93

likelihood

121. Note that +p5 .10; *p : .05; **p

5 .01; and *** p:5 .001.

_
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APPENDIX II

Cases Included in Study
Term

Case

Number

Oral Arg. Date

2008

Forest Grove School Dist. V.
T.A.
United States, Ex Rel. Eisenstein
v. City of New York
Nken v. Mukasey
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council
Cone v. Bell
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v.
linkLine Communications, Inc.
Haywood v. Drown
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
Jimenez v. Quarterman
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Glenn
v. Federal Election
Davis
Commission
Irizarry v. United States
Greenlaw v. United States
United States v. Clintwood
Elkhorn Mining Co.
Chamber of Commerce of United
States v. Brown
Rothgery v. Gillespie County
Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board
Kentucky Retirement Systems v.
EEOC
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transp. Assn.
Danforth v. Minnesota
United States v. Williams

08-305

Apr. 28, 2009

08-660

Apr. 21, 2009

08-681
07-984

Jan. 21,2009
Jan. 12, 2009

07-1114
07-512

Dec. 9 2008
Dec. 8, 2008

07-10374
07-665
07-6984
06-1505

Dec. 3, 2008
Nov. 12, 2008
Nov.4, 2008
Apr.23, 2008

06-923

Apr.23, 2008

07-320

Apr. 22, 2008

06-7517
07-330
07-308

Apr. 15, 2008
Apr. 15, 2008
Mar. 24, 2008

06-939

Mar. 19,2008

07-440
07-21

Mar. 17, 2008
Jan. 9, 2008

06-1037

Jan. 9, 2008

06-457

Nov. 28, 2007

06-8273
06-694

Oct. 31, 2007
Oct. 30, 2007

2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
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2007

2007
2007

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
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New York State Board of
Elections, ET AL. v. Margarita
Lopez Torres, ET AL.
Brian Michael Gall v. United
States
Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican
Party
Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v.
Hanson
Hinck v. United States
Brendlin v. California
Tennessee Secondary School
v.
Association
Athletic
Brentwood Academy
Leather
Leegin
Creative
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.
Wilkie v. Robbins
Morse v. Frederick
Smith v. Texas
Washington
v.
Davenport
Education Association
Rockwell International Corp. v.
United States
Burton v. Stewart
Carey v. Musladin
Kansas v. Marsh (Reargued)
Empire HealthChoice Assurance,
Inc. v. McVeigh
Dixon v. United States
Brigham City v. Stuart
Beard v. Banks
Garcetti v. Ceballos (Reargued)
Howard Delivery Ser ice, Inc. v.
Zurich American Ins.
League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry
Randall v. Sorrell

06-766

Oct.3, 2007

06-7949

Oct. 2, 2007

06-713

Oct. 1, 2007

06-969

Apr. 25, 2007

06-618

Apr. 24,2007

06-376
06-8120
06-427

Apr. 23, 2007
Apr. 23, 2007
Apr. 18, 2007

06-480

Mar. 26, 2007

06-219
06-278
05-11304

05-1589

Mar. 19, 2007
Mar. 19,2007
Jan. 17, 2007
Jan. 10, 2007

05-1272

Dec. 5, 2006

05-9222
05-785
04-1170
05-200

Nov. 11, 2006
Oct.11, 2006
Apr. 25, 2006
Apr. 25, 2006

05-7053
05-502
04-1739
04-473
05-123

Apr. 25, 2006
Apr. 24, 2006
Mar. 27, 2006
Mar. 21, 2006
Mar. 21, 2006

05-204

Mar. 1, 2006

04-1528

Feb. 28,2006
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2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

Holmes v. South Carolina
Rapanos v. United States
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.
Federal Election Commission
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc.
National
v.
Scheidler

04-1327
04-1034
04-1581

Feb. 22, 2006
Feb. 21, 2006
Jan. 17, 2006

04-1152

Dec. 6, 2005

04-1244

Nov. 30, 2005

03-1488
04-480

Mar. 22, 2005
Mar. 29, 2005

04-37
03-1164

Jan. 19, 2005
Dec. 8, 2004

02-1672

Nov. 30, 2004

Organization for Women, Inc.

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

Tory v. Cochran
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
v. Beaver
Clingman v.
Beaver
Clingman
Veneman v. Livestock Marketing
Association
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education
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